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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 98-1007 
 
IN RE: UNISYS SAVINGS PLAN LITIGATION 
 
JOHN P. MEINHARDT, on behalf of himself and all others 
similarly situated 
 
v. 
UNISYS CORPORATION (E.D. PA. Civil No. 91-cv-03067) 
 
BERNARD MCDEVITT, on behalf of himself and all others 
similarly situated 
 
v. 
 
UNISYS CORPORATION (E.D. PA. Civil No. 91-cv-03126) 
 
PARKER C. KEAN, on behalf of himself and all others 
similarly situated 
 
v. 
 
UNISYS CORPORATION (E.D. PA. Civil No. 91-cv-03164) 
 
MICHAEL HECK; JOSEPH MCCARTHY; ANGELO 
DEPIETRO, on behalf of themselves and all others 
similarly situated 
 
v. 
 
UNISYS CORPORATION; THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
COMMITTEE OF THE UNISYS SAVINGS PLAN; THE 
INVESTMENT COMMITTEE OF THE UNISYS SAVINGS 
PLAN; JACK A. BLAINE; JOHN J. LOUGHLIN; KENNETH 
MILLER; DAVID A. WHITE; STEFAN RIESENFELD 
(E.D. PA. Civil No. 91-cv-03276) 
 
GARY VALA, individually and on behalf of all others 
similarly situated 
 
v. 
 
 
  
JACK A. BLAINE; MICHAEL R. LOSEY; JOHN J. 
LOUGHLIN; KENNETH L. MILLER; STEFAN C. 
RIESENFELD; CURTIS A. HESSLER; DAVID A WHITE; 
UNISYS CORPORATION; THE NORTHERN 
TRUST COMPANY 
(E.D. PA. Civil No. 91-cv-03278) 
 
CAROLYN A. GOHLIKE, on behalf of herself and all others 
similarly situated 
 
v. 
 
UNISYS CORPORATION (E.D. PA. Civil No. 91-cv-03321) 
 
NADIA F. SOS; FAROUK M. SOS, individually and on 
behalf of all others similarly situated 
 
v. 
 
UNISYS CORPORATION (E.D. PA. Civil No. 91-cv-03582) 
 
KENNETH GOERS; JOHN J. CIESLICKI, on behalf of 
themselves and all others similarly situated 
 
v. 
 
UNISYS CORPORATION; THE NORTHERN 
TRUST COMPANY 
(E.D. PA. Civil No. 91-cv-04678) 
 
DENNIS C. STANGA; JAMES M. COLLINS, on behalf of 
themselves and all others similarly situated 
 
v. 
 
UNISYS CORPORATION (E.D. PA. Civil No. 91-cv-04689) 
 
JOHN H. BURGESS, JR., on behalf of himself and all 
others similarly situated 
 
v. 
 
UNISYS CORPORATION (E.D. PA. Civil No. 91-cv-04696) 
 
WILLIAM TORKILDSON 
 
v. 
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UNISYS CORPORATION (E.D. PA. Civil No. 91-cv-04754) 
 
       John M. Meinhardt, Michael Heck, Joseph 
       McCarthy, Angelo DiPietro, Gary Vala, Carolyn 
       Gohlike, Dennis C. Stanga, James M. Collins, 
       John H. Burgess, Jr., Bernard McDevitt, Parker 
       Kean, Nadia F. Sos, Farouk M. Sos, Kenneth 
       Goers, John J. Cieslicki, and William 
       Torkildson, plaintiffs in the above-listed 
       actions, individually and on behalf of the class 
       certified by Order of the district court entered 
       on January 28, 1992 in Master File Civil 
       Action No. 91-3067, 
 
       Appellants 
 
No. 98-1037 
 
IN RE: UNISYS SAVINGS PLAN LITIGATION 
 
JOHN P. MEINHARDT, on behalf of himself and all others 
similarly situated 
 
v. 
 
UNISYS CORPORATION 
 
(E.D. PA. Civil No. 91-cv-03067) 
 
HENRY ZYLLA; RICHARD SILVER; RONALD GRIPPO; 
EDWARD LAWLER; RICHARD ANDUJAR; CLARENCE 
MULLER; CHARLES WAHLER; JAMES MCLAUGHLIN; 
DONALD RADER; JOSEPH LAU; JAMES GANGALE; 
ALFRED CONTARINO; JOHN MARCUCCI; JOSEPH A. 
FIORE; RICHARD MASTRODOMENICO; NICK KLEMENZ; 
PETER SZCZYBEK, on behalf of themselves and all others 
similarly situated; ENGINEERS UNION LOCAL 444 OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRONIC, 
ELECTRICAL, SALARIED, MACHINE AND FURNITURE 
WORKERS, A.F.L.-C.I.O.; LOCALS 445 OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRONIC, ELECTRICAL, 
SALARIED, MACHINE AND FURNITURE WORKERS, 
A.F.L.-C.I.O.; LOCALS 450 OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
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UNION OF ELECTRONIC, ELECTRICAL, SALARIED, 
MACHINE AND FURNITURE WORKERS, A.F.L.-C.I.O.; 
LOCALS 470 OF THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF 
ELECTRONIC, ELECTRICAL, SALARIED, MACHINE AND 
FURNITURE WORKERS, A.F.L.-C.I.O.; LOCALS 165 OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRONIC, 
ELECTRICAL, SALARIED, MACHINE AND FURNITURE 
WORKERS, A.F.L.-C.I.O.; LOCAL 3, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, A.F.L.-C.I.O. 
 
v. 
 
UNISYS CORPORATION; EDWIN P. GILBERT; JOHN J. 
LOUGHLIN; THOMAS PENHALE, individually and in their 
capacities as members of the Unisys Employee Benefits 
Executive Committee and administrators of the Unisys 
Retirement Investment Plan; RICHARD H. BIERLY, EDWIN 
P. GILBERT; CURTIS A. HESSLER; LEON J. LEVEL; 
KENNETH L. MILLER; DAVID A. WHITE; JACK A. 
BLAINE; STEFAN C. RIESENFELD; GEORGE T. ROBSON, 
individually and in their capacities as members of the 
Investment Committee of the Unisys Retirement 
Investment Plan 
 
(E.D. PA. Civil No. 91-cv-03772) 
 
       Henry Zylla, Richard Silver, Ronald Grippo, 
       Edward Lawler, Richard Andujar, Clarence 
       Muller, Charles Wahler, James McLaughlin, 
       Donald Rader, Joseph Lau, James Gangale, 
       Alfred Contarino, Richard Colby, John 
       Marcucci, Joseph Fiore, Richard 
       Mastrodomenico, Nick Klemenz and Peter 
       Szczybek, plaintiffs in the above-listed actions, 
       individually and on behalf of the class certified 
       by Order of the district court entered on 
       January 28, 1992 in Master File Civil Action 
       No. 91-3067, 
 
       Appellants 
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On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 91-cv-03067) 
District Judge: Honorable Herbert J. Hutton 
 
Argued Friday, September 25, 1998 
 
BEFORE: BECKER, Chief Judge, 
WEIS and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed March 22, 1999) 
 
       James R. Malone, Jr. (Argued) 
       Michael E. Gottsch 
       Pamela Nicolaysen 
       Chimicles, Jacobsen & Tikellis 
       361 West Lancaster Avenue 
       One Haverford Centre 
       Haverford, PA 19041 
 
       Joel C. Meredith 
       Daniel B. Allanoff 
       Meredith Cohen Greenfogel & 
       Skirnick, P.C. 
       117 S. 17th Street 
       22nd Floor 
       Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
       Attorneys for Appellants 
 
       Laurence Z. Shiekman (Argued) 
       Brian T. Ortelere 
       Pepper Hamilton LLP 
       3000 Two Logan Square 
       18th & Arch Streets 
       Philadelphia, PA 19103 
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       John Teklits 
       Unisys Corporation 
       Township Line & Union Meeting 
       P.O. Box 500 C2NW14 
       Blue Bell, PA 19424-0001 
 
       Attorneys for Appellees 
 
       Marvin Krislov 
       Deputy Solicitor for 
       National Operations 
 
       Marc I. Machiz 
       Associate Solicitor 
 
       Karen L. Handorf 
       Counsel for Special Litigation 
 
       Paul C. Adair 
       Trial Attorney 
       U.S. Department of Labor 
       Office of the Solicitor 
       Plan Benefits Security Division 
       P.O. Box 1914 
       Washington, D.C. 20013 
 
       Attorneys for Secretary of Labor as 
       Amicus Curiae in Support of 
       Plaintiffs-Appellants 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
This action, brought by employees who had participated 
in individual account pension plans maintained by their 
employer Unisys Corporation ("Unisys"), charged essentially 
that Unisys and the individual defendants1  had breached 
their fiduciary duties prescribed by ERISA2 by investing in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Unisys is one of eleven defendants. Other defendants are the 
Administrative Committee and the Investment Committee of the Plan and 
those individuals involved in making decisions for the Plan. The 
defendants will be referred to collectively as "Unisys." 
 
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. 
S 1001 et seq. 
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Executive Life Insurance Guaranteed Investment Contracts 
("GICs"). After a bench trial, the District Court granted 
judgment for all defendants, ruling in their favor on all 
issues related to the breach of fiduciary duty claims, thus 
denying all relief and damages to the plaintiff class of 
Unisys employees.3 
 
We have reviewed the trial record independently and 
conclude that in all material respects, the District Court's 
findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. 
Gottheimer's testimony, and the District Court did not err 
in making its conclusions of law. We also conclude that 
while we do not agree with some of the holdings of the 
District Court, those disagreements have no effect on the 
District Court's overall holding of prudence, and that 
therefore, the orders entered by the District Court on 
November 24, 1997 and January 9, 1998 will be affirmed. 
 
I. 
 
This is the second appeal from the District Court's 
rulings in this case. Initially, summary judgment was 
entered in favor of Unisys, but on review, we remanded for 
trial. In re Unisys Savings Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 56 (1996) ("Unisys I"). Almost all of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Plaintiffs are a class of Unisys employees who will be referred to 
throughout this Opinion as "Meinhardt." John P. Meinhardt had 
originally brought this action as a class action on behalf of himself and 
all others similarly situated. See In re Unisys Savings Plan Litig., 74 
F.3d 
420 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 56 (1996) ("Unisys I"). 
 
This is an appeal of two consolidated cases. In thefirst action, final 
judgment was entered on November 24, 1997 in eleven related actions 
after a bench trial. A timely notice of appeal wasfiled on December 18, 
1997. We exercise appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291, as an 
appeal from a final judgment. 
 
The second appeal before this court involves the ERISA claims in a 
twelfth related action, upon which final judgment has not been entered. 
The District Court certified the ERISA claims in that action under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 54(b) on January 9, 1998; a notice of appeal was filed on 
January 16, 1998. We exercise appellate jurisdiction for the second 
appeal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) in tandem with 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
                                7 
  
the background facts and details are found in our earlier 
opinion and we refer here only to those matters particularly 
relevant to the arguments made by the parties on appeal. 
 
Now that the District Court has rendered its findings of 
fact and conclusions of law in favor of the Unisys, 4 
Meinhardt complains that the standard used by the District 
Court was improper, that Meinhardt's expert's testimony 
was improperly excluded, and that Meinhardt suffered 
damages that were not recognized by the District Court. As 
indicated above, we hold that the District Court's essential 
factual findings were not clearly erroneous and that 
measured by the appropriate prudence standard of ERISA, 
the District Court properly concluded that Unisys did not 
breach any fiduciary duty. This threshold holding makes it 
unnecessary for us to discuss in detail the subsidiary 
issues raised on appeal by Meinhardt. 
 
At the outset we call attention to the fact that the 
contours of the factual record have changed significantly 
since we last addressed the GIC issue presented in this 
case. At the earlier summary judgment stage, the prior 
panel of this court was obliged to assume that various facts 
presented by Meinhardt were true and that all inferences 
had to be drawn in Meinhardt's favor. Moreover, we 
assumed the report of Dr. Gottheimer, Meinhardt's 
proposed expert witness, would be admitted into evidence. 
As we discuss infra, the District Court properly excluded 
Dr. Gottheimer from testifying under Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
 
As we have mentioned, at the conclusion of a ten-day 
bench trial, the District Court entered judgment for Unisys 
and issued extensive findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. We review the District Court's findings of facts for clear 
error. Application of legal precepts to historical facts 
receives plenary review. Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 
222 n.9 (3d Cir. 1995). The District Court's decision to 
qualify an expert is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The District Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law can be 
found at In re Unisys Savings Plan Litig., No. 91-3067, 1997 WL 732473 
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 1997). For the sake of convenience, we will refer to 
the 
District Court's findings of fact as "FF P __," and to its conclusions of 
law 
as "CL P __." 
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General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997); In re Paoli 
R.R. Yard Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 741-46 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Paoli 
II"). 
 
II. 
 
Meinhardt participated in a 401(k) savings plan ("Plan")5 
administered by Unisys. Two companies, Sperry and 
Burroughs, had merged in 1986 to create Unisys, and thus 
their retirement plans also merged. See Unisys I, 74 F.3d at 
425-26. Meinhardt and the class he represents elected to 
invest their money in two of the funds offered by the Plan, 
the Fixed Income Fund ("FIF ") and the Insurance Contract 
Fund ("ICF "). Investments in the FIF/ICF were exclusively 
restricted to Guaranteed Investment Contracts ("GICs").6 
For ease of reference throughout this Opinion we will refer 
to the FIF/ICF as the "Fund." 
 
Unisys described the Fund as one of the more 
conservative funds that was intended to return principal 
with interest.7 Plan participants could invest as much or as 
little of their money as they desired. In order to prevent 
interest rate arbitrage by the participants and in order to 
receive a higher yield from the GICs, Fund assets could not 
be transferred to the money market fund directly; Fund 
assets had to be held for at least a year in one of the four 
equity stock funds. In 1990, Unisys shortened this "equity 
wash" to a period of six months after receiving approval 
from Executive Life. App. 1702. 
 
In 1987 and 1988, Unisys purchased three Executive Life 
GICs as investments for the Fund. The Executive Life GICs 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Plan is actually three separate plans that make joint investments. 
See Unisys I, 74 F.3d at 426-27 & 427 n.5. 
 
6. A GIC is a contract under which the issuer is obligated to repay the 
principal deposit at a designated future date and to pay interest at a 
specified rate over the duration of the contract. Unisys I, 74 F.3d at 
426. 
 
7. The Plan offered five other investment funds: the Diversified Fund, the 
Indexed Equity Fund, the Active Equity Fund, the Unisys Common Stock 
Fund, and the Short Term Investment Fund ("money market fund"). The 
money market fund invested in United States Treasury Bills, bank 
obligations, and other short term investments. 
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themselves were comprised of assets that potentially had 
high rates of return, some of which were high yield bonds, 
or "junk bonds." The junk bonds did not fare well in the 
late 1980's markets. In 1991, California regulators seized 
Executive Life and temporarily froze all payments from the 
Executive Life GICs. By 1996, however, the Fund 
reimbursed the principal to Meinhardt and had paid some 
interest, but at a lower rate than had been guaranteed. 
FF P 80. 
 
Meinhardt accuses Unisys of breaching its fiduciary 
duties of prudence, diversification, and disclosure with 
respect to the Executive Life contracts that had been 
purchased for the Fund. ERISA prescribes that fiduciaries 
must adhere to a standard of prudence. ERISA requires 
that a fiduciary's duty shall be discharged: 
 
       with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the 
       circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man 
       acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters 
       would use in the conduct of an enterprise with like 
       character and with like aims; . . . . 
 
29 U.S.C. S 1104(a)(1)(B). 
 
III. 
 
To determine whether Unisys had satisfied the ERISA 
standard of prudence, the district court found the following 
facts from the evidence. 
 
Unisys delegated the responsibility of investing for the 
Fund to David White and Leon Level. White and Level have 
educational and practical backgrounds in financial matters. 
FF PP 17-18; App. 643-45, 1136-37. At the direction of 
White and Level, Unisys purchased three Executive Life 
GICs as investments for the Fund through bidding 
processes in June 1987, December 1987 (both for the FIF), 
and January 1988 (for the ICF). Of the many GICs 
purchased for the Fund, only three were Executive Life 
GICs, constituting between 15 and 20 percent of the Fund's 
assets. FF PP 14-15; App. 4450. Unisys, through White and 
Level, considered many firms through a process of 
competitive bidding, and Unisys heard in-person 
 
                                10 
  
presentations from the insurance companies. FF P 20; App. 
523, 1154. 
 
Unisys presented evidence that for the first bid (June 
1987), White and Level hired an experienced investment 
consultant, Murray Becker, who evaluated many different 
insurance firms.8 FF P 20. In evaluating potential insurance 
companies from which to purchase GICs, Becker obtained 
information and ratings from Standard and Poor's and A.M. 
Best, ratings services that evaluate the stability and 
potential profitability of various types of companies 
including insurance companies. Both ratings services gave 
Executive Life their highest rating.9 Becker and others 
testified that the ratings services were quite thorough 
because they analyzed raw data and interviewed investment 
managers. App. 535. Becker testified that he and other 
professionals had a high confidence in the thoroughness of 
the ratings services, which led to their respective ratings. 
FF P 21; App. 658-62, 702-03, 708-12, 1160-61. As detailed 
in the District Court's findings of fact, Becker was very 
familiar with how the ratings services evaluated the GICs. 
Id. 
 
Prior to the first bid, Unisys reviewed Becker's bid 
specifications. FF P 20 n.2; App. 1267-68, 3659. White 
testified that he carefully considered the use of high yield 
bonds and knew the risks involved. The prevailing view in 
the investment world at that time was that high yield 
guaranteed insurance contracts were good risks. FF P 27; 
App. 1038-39. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Becker had given Sperry advice about GICs through his firm, Johnson 
& Higgins, before the Unisys merger. See Unisys I, 74 F.3d at 427. 
Becker handled more than 500 such bids in his career. FF P 20; App. 
522. 
 
9. Standard and Poor's gave Executive Life an AAA rating, which was 
reaffirmed on several occasions to meet questions concerning, inter alia, 
the inclusion of high yield bonds in Executive Life's portfolio. FF P 23. 
An 
"AAA" rating means that an insurer offers"superior financial security on 
both an absolute and relative basis." The insurer possesses "the highest 
safety and [has] an overwhelming capacity to meet policyholder 
obligations." FF P 24; App. 4279. A.M. Best also gave Executive Life its 
highest rating, A+. FF P 24. 
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In addition to understanding the risks associated with 
Executive Life GICs, White chose Executive Life GICs for 
their other unique features. He selected the three Executive 
Life GICs to balance other Fund investments -- the 
Executive Life GICs had longer maturity dates, App. 656- 
57, 692, and their portfolios lacked real estate mortgages or 
derivatives and had a low proportion of commercial real 
estate investments. App. 1010, 1156-58. Furthermore, 
Executive Life used the "barbell" approach in making 
investments for the GICs; that is, the higher risk associated 
with the high yield bonds was balanced with low risk, lower 
yield government bills. FF P 25; App. 1156-58. 
 
For the second two bids and upon completion of the 
merger between Burroughs and Sperry into Unisys, Unisys 
decided not to utilize Becker's services. White, Level, and 
three other employees under their direction had sufficient 
professional experience to select GIC issuers. Moreover, 
Becker had charged the Plan $25,000 per bid. FF P 31; App. 
1162-65. White and Level expanded the list of potential 
bidders for the second and third bids and maximized the 
market information available to them. FF P 32; App. 1054- 
55. 
 
In the months between the bids, White and Level 
"engaged in an ongoing process of reviewing and updating 
the information on the potential bidders." FF P 33; App. 
615-22. They testified that they also kept abreast of 
developments in the GIC industry by reading trade 
publications and journals. FF P 33 n.6; App. 617, 632. They 
analyzed the portfolio and risk of the insurance carriers, 
using the Standard and Poor's and A.M. Best ratings as a 
source of information about both the insurance companies' 
asset composition and their creditworthiness. FF P 35; App. 
1056. They testified that they would not have been able to 
replicate the analyses done by the ratings services in- 
house. App. 711. They had available to them SEC forms 
10K and 10Q to review prior to making their selection. 
FF P 35; App. 1065-66, 631. They had also consulted with 
a firm that Unisys had engaged to advise it on its defined 
benefit pension plan. That firm advised Unisys on its 
selection of issuers for the GIC funds. App. 608, 626-27. 
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In Unisys I, 74 F.3d at 436, we directed the District 
Court to determine whether the ratings could be used 
reliably by Unisys. As mentioned earlier, Level and White 
both testified that the ratings services were respected for 
their competence and thoroughness throughout the 
investment and finance community. App. 1160-61, 658- 
623, 702, 708-11. The District Court found that the ratings 
services provided reliable information. FF P 21. We are 
satisfied that this finding is not clearly erroneous. See also 
Bussian v. RJR Nabisco, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, No. Civ. A. H- 
91-1533, 1998 WL 639320, at *7 (S.D. Tx. Sept. 2, 1998) 
("Nabisco's use of the consultant and rating agencies [in 
selecting an Executive Life annuity] does not demonstrate 
imprudence."). 
 
The District Court also resolved at trial four other issues 
of fact that we identified in Unisys I. First, evidence in the 
summary judgment record may have indicated that Becker 
had recommended the purchase of a three-year GIC, rather 
than a five-year GIC. Unisys I, 74 F.3d at 427. At trial, 
however, Becker testified that he had not recommended the 
shorter maturity (three-year) Executive Life GIC. Rather, his 
discussion with Unisys officers about maturity dates was 
very general, leading to the conclusion that the investment 
in five-year GICs was appropriate. FF P 30; App. 555-558. 
 
Second, at the summary judgment stage, the evidence 
suggested that Becker told White that Executive Life would 
lose its AAA rating from Standard & Poor if its investments 
of junk bonds exceeded 35%, and White believed that 40- 
50% of Executive Life's investments were junk bonds. 
Unisys I, 74 F.3d at 427. At trial, Becker stated that it was 
not his view that Executive Life would lose their Standard 
and Poor's AAA rating if high yield bonds comprised more 
than 35% of Executive Life's portfolio. Rather, he testified 
that Executive Life thought its AAA rating might be in 
jeopardy if their high yield bond holdings exceeded 35%. 
However, Standard and Poor's had access to the actual 
percentage of high yield bonds in Executive Life's portfolio, 
and it still issued a AAA rating to Executive Life. Thus, 
White's reliance on the AAA rating was neither 
unreasonable nor imprudent. As discussed infra, even if 
White had an erroneous view of the percentage of high yield 
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bonds in Executive Life's portfolio, a hypothetical prudent 
fiduciary would have known that Executive Life's high yield 
bond percentage was within an acceptable range in 
Executive Life's and Standard and Poor's analyses. FF P 28; 
App 501.10 
 
Third, in Unisys I, we stated: 
 
       [A] reasonable factfinder could infer from this evidence 
       that Unisys failed to analyze the bases underlying 
       [Becker's] opinion of Executive Life's financial condition 
       and to determine for itself whether credible data 
       supported [Becker's] recommendation that Unisys 
       consider investing plan assets with the insurer. A 
       reasonable factfinder could also conclude that Unisys 
       passively accepted its consultant's positive appraisal of 
       Executive Life without conducting the independent 
       investigation that ERISA requires. 
 
Unisys I, 74 F.3d at 435-36 (emphasis added). However, 
after taking evidence at trial, the District Court did not find 
that Unisys had failed to make its own evaluation of 
Executive Life's financial condition, nor did itfind that 
Unisys "passively" had accepted Becker's appraisal. On the 
contrary, the District Court made numerous findings that 
White and Level were aware of the composition of assets of 
Executive Life GICs and that they understood the risks 
associated with each of those assets. FF PP 25-27. 
 
Fourth, in Unisys I, we advised the District Court that it 
should determine the significance, if any, of Executive Life's 
substantially higher interest rates. We suggested that 
dramatically higher interest rates might have prompted 
Unisys to conduct extra investigation into Executive Life's 
creditworthiness. As stated earlier, at trial, White testified 
that he carefully had considered the use of high yield bonds 
and knew the risks involved. Unisys recognized that higher 
rates could, over time, yield dramatic differences in income, 
but that the trustees were "constrained by their standards 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. As counsel for Unisys pointed out at oral argument, if Executive Life 
had 40% of its holdings in high yield bonds, and Executive Life GICs 
constituted 15-20% of the Fund, White invested only 8% of the Fund 
assets in high yield bonds. 
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of risk tolerance." FF P 25; App. 1250. The District Court 
credited the testimony of the Unisys fiduciaries and was 
satisfied and concluded that Unisys had made a reasonable 
and thorough investigation of Executive Life GICs. CL P 3. 
We will not disturb that holding here.11  
 
IV. 
 
The District Court's factual findings support its legal 
conclusions that Unisys was prudent under the standard 
articulated in ERISA and that a hypothetical prudent 
investor would have purchased each of the three GICs. As 
we stated in Unisys I, ERISA requires that afiduciary shall 
discharge his duties 
 
       with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the 
       circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man 
       acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters 
       would use in the conduct of an enterprise with like 
       character and with like aims; . . . . 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Meinhardt contests three other alleged failures of the District Court 
to follow this Court's mandate or to consider evidence in the record. 
Each of these objections however, is without merit because Meinhardt 
did not tender an expert to show how these facts supported the 
conclusion that Unisys was imprudent. 
 
First, the evidence revealed that Unisys did not have written 
investment or diversification standards for the Fund, but that it had 
guidelines for the money market fund. However, Meinhardt did not 
present evidence that prudence required written fund guidelines and 
Unisys testified that the unwritten guideline for investment diversity was 
that no one investment should constitute more than 20% of a fund's 
portfolio. 
 
Second, some evidence suggested that Unisys spent less than twenty 
minutes evaluating each bidder on bid day. Meinhardt presented no 
evidence that more time should have been spent at bid day, and 
considering this fact in isolation ignores evidence of Unisys's 
investigation and consideration of each bidder prior to bid day. 
 
Third, Unisys admitted at trial that the FIF bids had late maturity 
dates, and thus Executive Life GICs would become larger percentages of 
the FIF as time wore on. App. 1081. Again, Meinhardt did not 
demonstrate that the percentages were ever beyond the norm. Moreover, 
the FIF was phasing out in favor of the ICF. 
 
                                15 
  
Unisys I, 74 F.3d at 434 (quoting 29 U.S.C. S 1104(a)(1)(B)). 
We also stated that the prudence requirement focuses on "a 
fiduciary's conduct in arriving at an investment decision, 
not on its results, and asking whether a fiduciary employed 
the appropriate methods to investigate and determine the 
merits of a particular investment." Id. 
 
After taking evidence on the issue of Unisys's prudence, 
the District Court held that the actions taken by the Fund's 
trustees satisfied the prudence standard: "Based on the 
evidence at trial I find that the Unisys fiduciaries undertook 
adequate and reasonable steps before purchasing the three 
Executive Life contracts." CL P 3. The District Court 
concluded, "Measured by any standard, the Unisys 
fiduciaries' actions are consistent with the prudence 
requirements of ERISA." CL P 13. We hold that the District 
Court's findings of fact support its conclusions of law that 
Unisys was prudent in investing in Executive Life GICs, and 
thus Meinhardt failed to prove an essential element of his 
ERISA claim. 
 
As an alternate theory for holding that Unisys was not 
imprudent, the District Court considered the objective 
prudence of Unisys investments in Executive Life GICs by 
applying the "hypothetical prudent investor" test. Unisys I, 
74 F.3d at 436 (citing Fink v. National Savings & Trust Co., 
772 F.2d 951, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) and Roth v. Sawyer-Cleator 
Lumber Co., 16 F.3d 915, 919 (8th Cir. 1994)). 
 
The District Court held that a hypothetical prudent 
fiduciary would have invested in Executive Life GICs 
because (1) Executive Life was qualified under federal 
regulations as an insurance company authorized to provide 
annuities to facilitate the termination of benefit pension 
plans because it was state licensed, 46 Fed. Reg. 9532, 
9534 (1981); (2) other judicial decisions endorsed the 
purchase of Executive Life annuities, e.g., Riley v. Murdock, 
890 F. Supp. 444, 458-60 (E.D.N.C. 1995);12 (3) Becker, the 
adviser Unisys retained for the first bid, included Executive 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. See also Bussian v. RJR Nabisco, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, No. Civ. A. H- 
91-1533, 1998 WL 639320 (S.D. Tx. Sept. 2, 1998) (decided after the 
District Court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law). 
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Life on his approved list of GIC bidders until six months 
after Unisys made its third and final purchase of Executive 
Life, App. 559; and (4) other well-known pension plans 
purchased Executive Life GICs. App. 559, 1742. The 
District Court did not err in concluding that a hypothetical 
prudent fiduciary would have made the same investments 
in Executive Life GICs as the investments made by Unisys. 
FF P 24 n.3; CL PP 8-10. 
 
In sum, we are satisfied that the District Court's holdings 
that Unisys was prudent, and in the alternative, that a 
hypothetical prudent fiduciary would have made the same 
investments, are supported by the evidence. 
 
V. 
 
In addition to holding that the trustees' actions satisfied 
the standard of prudence required by ERISA, the District 
Court went on to discuss why the trustees' actions were not 
arbitrary and capricious. The District Court need not have 
discussed application of an arbitrary and capricious 
standard in this case. In light of the District Court's holding 
of prudence and our affirmance of that holding, the District 
Court's discussion of an arbitrary and capricious standard 
cannot affect the judgment in favor of Unisys. 
 
In Unisys I, we stated that fiduciaries of investment plans 
had to satisfy the "prudent" legal standard specified in 
ERISA, cited supra. We stated that one of ERISA's 
underlying purposes was "to enforce strict fiduciary 
standards." Unisys I, 74 F.3d at 434 (citing 29 U.S.C. 
S 1001 and H.R. Rep. No. 93-533 (1974), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4639-43). 
 
In Struble v. New Jersey Brewery Employees' Welfare 
Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1984), we held 
specifically that the duties of loyalty and prudence 
demanded by ERISA should not be reviewed through an 
"arbitrary and capricious" lens. We held that the "standards 
set forth explicitly in ERISA" should be used to evaluate the 
trustees' conduct. Id. at 333-34 (finding support in cases 
from the Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits). Struble 
governs the question of Unisys's duty of prudence under 
ERISA. 
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The District Court should have applied only the standard 
of "prudence under the circumstances" as required by the 
statute. Only the standard found in ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 
S 1104(a)(1)(B); Unisys I, 74 F.3d at 434, should have been 
applied to determine whether Unisys's investment methods 
were prudent. 
 
As authority for an arbitrary and capricious standard, 
the District Court cited Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 
(1996), Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 
(1989), and Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1115 (1996). These cases, 
however, involved situations not relevant to the present 
claims asserted against Unisys. 
 
In the context of a case challenging a denial of benefits 
under 29 U.S.C. S 1332(a)(1)(B) -- and not challenging the 
prudence of investment decisions -- the Supreme Court 
held that the "inherently discretionary" nature of fiduciary 
functions does not necessarily require a deferential 
standard of review. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 
489 U.S. 101, 112 (1989). Under ERISA, the standard of 
review over a trustee's decision to deny benefits or the 
interpretation of the plan is de novo as a general rule; only 
when the plan gives the trustee discretion to deny benefits 
or construe the terms of the plan should a court employ the 
arbitrary and capricious standard. As the instant case does 
not concern a denial of benefits under 29 U.S.C. 
S 1332(a)(1)(B) or an interpretation of Unisys's Plan, 
Firestone's standard is inapplicable. Nor did Varity Corp. v. 
Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996), involve a claim that a trustee's 
investments were imprudent -- the claim that Meinhardt 
makes here. 
 
In Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 1115 (1996), we did apply a deferent 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review to a claim by a 
plan's participants that the fiduciary was imprudent. We 
were careful to point out in Moench, however, that our 
holding was limited to the specific type of plan involved in 
that case, an Employee Stock Ownership Plan ("ESOP"). 
Here, of course, the Unisys Plan was not an Employee 
Stock Ownership Plan. Furthermore, Moench specifically 
held its analysis was in "complete harmony with the 
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prudent man standard of care obligations imposed by 29 
U.S.C. S 1104 on fiduciaries, as our holding implicates only 
the standard of review of the conduct of a fiduciary and not 
the standards governing that conduct," Moench, 62 F.3d at 
566 n.3 (emphasis added), as is the case here. 
 
In sum, Unisys's methods of making that decision must 
be evaluated using the ERISA standard mandated by 
Unisys I and in accordance with Struble. The District Court 
did not err in concluding that Unisys did not breach its 
duty of prudence. 
 
For these reasons, the District Court's discussion of an 
arbitrary and capricious standard was superfluous and 
constitutes no more than harmless error. Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. 
The District Court's statements that Unisys's actions were 
not arbitrary and capricious do not negate its otherwise 
correct holding that Unisys satisfied the ERISA prudence 
standard. 
 
VI. 
 
Meinhardt also argues that the District Court abused its 
discretion when it decided to exclude the testimony of Dr. 
George M. Gottheimer, one of Meinhardt's two proposed 
expert witnesses.13 Meinhardt offered Dr. Gottheimer to 
testify on the subject of "the customary methods of 
investigating the financial condition and creditworthiness of 
insurance companies." 
 
To qualify as an expert under Fed. R. Evid. 702, a 
witness must have sufficient qualifications in the form of 
knowledge, skills, and training. Additionally, the court must 
find that the testimony of the expert will be reliable and 
that the testimony will "fit," that is, assist the trier of fact. 
In re Paoli R.R. Yard Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 741-43 (3d Cir. 
1994). While it may be arguable that the "fit" prescribed in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Meinhardt's expert Tsetsekos was qualified to testify and did testify 
on the issue of damages caused by Unisys's alleged breaches of its 
duties of diversification and disclosure. However, the District Court held 
that his testimony was insufficient to prove that any alleged failure to 
diversify or disclose information caused Meinhardt and the other class 
plaintiffs to suffer losses. We agree. See infra Parts VII and VIII. 
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In re Paoli is a "fit" reflecting on the substance of the 
witness' testimony, we think it just as relevant to the "fit" 
reflecting on the witness' credibility. Indeed, in the recent 
Supreme Court decision discussing the standard of review 
applicable to the admission and exclusion of expert 
evidence, the Supreme Court refers to the District Court's 
"gatekeeper" role of screening such evidence to ensure that 
it is not only relevant but reliable. The Court goes on to 
write, "A court of appeals applying `abuse of discretion' 
review to [expert testimony] rulings may not categorically 
distinguish between rulings allowing expert testimony and 
rulings which disallow it." General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 118 
S. Ct. 512, 517 (1997). Thus in our view, the Court's 
emphasis on reliability as well as on relevancy embraces 
within its standard the credibility of the witness proffering 
expert opinion. This is particularly true where, as here, it is 
the district court judge sitting as a finder of fact who must 
rule on issues of evidence. See Goodman v. Highlands Ins. 
Co., 607 F.2d 665, 668 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[A] trial judge 
sitting without a jury is entitled to even greater latitude 
concerning the admission or exclusion of evidence."). 
 
While we could understand issue being taken with the 
Goodman precept, it appears to us after Joiner that the 
Goodman standard has been given increased viability. 
Although Joiner was a summary judgment decision, it 
nevertheless emphasized that Daubert did not alter the 
general rule announced in Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645 
(1978). In Edgar, the Court stated, " `cases arise where it is 
very much a matter of discretion with the court whether to 
receive or exclude the evidence; but the appellate court will 
not reverse in such a case, unless the ruling is manifestly 
erroneous.' " Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 517 (quoting Edgar, 99 
U.S. at 658). After so stating, the Court rejected any 
alteration of this rule and in the context of expert testimony 
said, "But Daubert [v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
509 U.S. 579 (1993)] did not address the standard of 
appellate review for evidentiary rulings at all. . .." Id. The 
Court then repeated that under Daubert " `the trial judge 
must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or 
evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.' " Id. 
(quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589). 
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The Court went on to hold in Joiner that the Eleventh 
Circuit had erred in reviewing the exclusion of Joiner's 
experts' testimony because it failed to give the trial court 
the deference that is the hallmark of abuse of discretion 
review. Id. (citing Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 97-99 
(1996)). The Court further held that the studies upon which 
Joiner's experts relied were not sufficient whether 
individually or in combination, to support their conclusions 
that Joiner's exposure to PCBs contributed to Joiner's 
cancer, and that the District Court therefore did not abuse 
its discretion in excluding their testimony.14 
 
In the instant case, the District Court ruled that Dr. 
Gottheimer's testimony would not be admissible for three 
reasons. First, the court found that Dr. Gottheimer's 
educational credentials were not of the highest caliber.15 
Second, during Dr. Gottheimer's voir dire, the District Court 
found Dr. Gottheimer not to be credible because he had 
made statements about his credentials that were 
inconsistent with his deposition testimony. Finally, the 
District Court found that Dr. Gottheimer's expertise was in 
property casualty insurance, not life insurance, and that 
Gottheimer had admitted in his deposition that there are 
"fundamental" differences in evaluating the two types of 
insurance. FF PP 101-05; CL PP 17-19. 
 
These three reasons coincide with the three requirements 
articulated in Paoli II: qualifications, reliability, and fit. The 
record discloses that Dr. Gottheimer's qualifications were 
less than stellar. Because he had testified untruthfully at 
voir dire, his testimony could well have been held 
unreliable. Finally, Dr. Gottheimer's alleged expertise, 
limited in any event to methods of investing with respect to 
property casualty insurance, did not fit with or meet the 
need of the District Court for expert testimony in life 
insurance investing. See Surace v. Caterpillar, Inc., 111 
F.3d 1039, 1055-56 (3d Cir. 1997). The District Court 
determined that Dr. Gottheimer could not be a credible 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Ultimately, the Court, on another issue, reversed the judgment and 
remanded the proceedings as to whether a material dispute of fact 
existed as to Joiner's alleged exposure to other elements. 
 
15. Dr. Gottheimer received his Ph. D. from a correspondence school. 
 
                                21 
  
witness based on admissions secured through the use of 
his prior sworn testimony. See FF PP 102-104. Because the 
District Court, as fact-finder, listened to the testimony and 
assessed the credibility of the witness, these findings are 
entitled to great deference by this Court. See Anderson v. 
City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564 (1985). 
 
Judge Becker, in his thoughtful and comprehensive 
dissent, while focusing almost exclusively on the standards 
for admissibility of scientific expert testimony, nevertheless 
acknowledges that "the factfinder is ordinarily the arbiter of 
general credibility," Dissent at 40, and that "the power to 
evaluate the credibility of witnesses and give testimony its 
proper weight primarily resides with the trier of fact." 
Dissent at 41. He also properly acknowledges that the 
decision to admit or to exclude expert testimony is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion. 
 
Judge Becker, however, fails to recognize or credit in his 
dissent two significant and controlling issues. First, Dr. 
Gottheimer's testimony does not fall within the scope of 
scientific testimony, and accordingly, it should not be tested 
by the particular standards required for testimony based on 
a particular scientific ethic.16 See Carmichael v. Samyang 
Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. granted sub 
nom. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 118 S. Ct. 2339 (1998). 
It is true of course that we have referred to the Paoli 
requirements of qualifications, reliability and fit -- but we 
have done so only to emphasize that, measured by any 
standard, scientific or non-scientific, the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Gottheimer's 
testimony. 
 
Second, and more important, the dissent, while 
acknowledging that it is the fact finder that determines 
weight and credibility of an expert's testimony, apparently 
overlooks the distinguishing circumstance here: the fact 
finder was the District Court judge himself, and not a jury. 
Judge Hutton made the critical credibility determination 
that he could not believe the testimony of Dr. Gottheimer, 
and that being so, no reason has been put forward as to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); In re 
Paoli R.R. Yard Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 741-43 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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why we should not credit and defer to the District Court's 
finding. Even if we might have made a different 
determination regarding Dr. Gottheimer's credibility, we are 
not at liberty to impose our opinion on the District Court.17 
 
We would be hard pressed to require a District Court 
judge sitting in a non-jury case who credibly and with 
reason found that he could not believe a witness to 
nevertheless hear the witness's direct examination, cross- 
examination, and rebuttal examination in an extended trial 
when he knew that he would only reject it as unbelievable. 
All the instances and cases cited by the dissent, see, e.g., 
Dissent at 32 n.1, 46 n.13, are those in which it was for the 
jury as fact finder to determine credibility and weight of the 
expert testimony. Thus, those cases are wholly inapplicable 
to the facts of this case. When the role of the gatekeeper to 
admit or exclude evidence (the judge) and the role of the 
factfinder to assess and weigh the evidence that was 
admitted (the jury) are one and the same, the judge who 
becomes the factfinder as well as the gatekeeper must be 
given great deference by this Court, and, as we note below, 
should not be required to waste judicial time. See Fed. R. 
Evid. 403. Therefore, we cannot say on this record that it 
was an abuse of the District Court's discretion to exclude 
Dr. Gottheimer's testimony. 
 
Even if the District Court had abused its discretion, and 
we hold that it did not, the error must be deemed harmless 
in light of the District Court's finding that Dr. Gottheimer 
was not credible. The District Court concluded, "If given the 
chance to testify, I could not find [Dr. Gottheimer] to be a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. As the Supreme Court of Maine stated: 
 
       We have previously stated that the determination of the 
       qualifications of expert witnesses is reserved to the sound 
discretion 
       of the trial judge. It follows, therefore, that appellate decisions 
       affirming the trial court do not necessarily stand for the 
proposition 
       that the opposite ruling would constitute error. 
 
Hanson v. Baker, 534 A.2d 665, 667 (Me. 1987) (citation omitted); see 
also Seese v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 844 (3d Cir. 1981) 
("[W]e recognize that the admission of expert testimony rests within the 
sound discretion of the district court and that the district court will be 
reversed only for an abuse of that discretion."). 
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credible witness given his evasiveness, if not his propensity 
to state falsehoods." CL P 18. Obviously, hearing testimony 
from a witness who was given no credence at all by the 
District Court judge presiding at a bench trial would have 
resulted in the "waste of time" proscribed by Federal Rule 
of Evidence 403, particularly where the false statements 
identified by the judge were material to the purported 
expert's qualifications. 
 
VII. 
 
ERISA requires a fiduciary to "diversify[ ] the investments 
of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless 
under the circumstances it is clearly not prudent to do so." 
29 U.S.C. S 1104(a)(1)(C). Meinhardt complains that Unisys 
invested an excessive amount of Fund investments in 
Executive Life GICs. As discussed in Unisys I, Congress did 
not try to quantify diversity with percentages, leaving that 
determination to the facts and circumstances as found by 
the courts. Unisys I, 74 F.3d at 438-40. 
 
The District Court determined that Meinhardt had not 
introduced evidence by way of expert testimony as to what 
would have constituted a properly diversified fund. At the 
time Executive Life went into receivership, the Fund had 
20% of its assets in Executive Life investments, and the 
court held this level of diversification to be proper.18 
CL PP 32-33. 
 
Nor did Meinhardt prove his case with respect to the duty 
to diversity because he did not show that the Fund suffered 
"large losses" as a result of any failure to diversify. This was 
an issue that the Court of Appeals specifically held was not 
known at the summary judgment stage. See Unisys I, 74 
F.3d at 440. Meinhardt presented no evidence of 
investments that would have constituted proper 
diversification in order to prove that Unisys did not properly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. The District Court combined the FIF and the ICF for purposes of 
diversification because the funds "worked together;" that is, the FIF was 
being phased out in favor of the ICF. Proceeds from matured FIF 
contracts were invested in the ICF, and no new investments were made 
in the FIF. FF P 79; App. 1510-12, 4450. 
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diversify the investments in the Fund or to enable the 
District Court to assess losses, if any, to Meinhardt for the 
difference. FF P 90. 
 
The duty to diversify and resulting damages from a 
breach of that duty could not be determined from the 
summary judgment record in Unisys I. Now that the trial 
has concluded, it is evident to us, as it was to the District 
Court, that Meinhardt's failure of proof did not lead to any 
determination that Unisys breached its duty to diversify or 
that damages resulted. 
 
VIII. 
 
Meinhardt claims that Unisys did not fulfill its obligation 
of making necessary disclosures under ERISA. 
 
In Unisys I, we stated that "a fiduciary may not materially 
mislead those to which section 1104(a)'s duties of loyalty 
and prudence are owed." Unisys I, 74 F.3d at 440-41. A 
fiduciary must make disclosures if silence would be 
harmful. Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare 
Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 1993). ERISA also 
requires plaintiffs to prove losses for any breach of fiduciary 
duty claim: 
 
       Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan 
       who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or 
       duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter 
       shall be personally liable to make good to such plan 
       any losses to the plan resulting from each such 
       breach. 
 
29 U.S.C. S 1109(a) (emphasis added). As Meinhardt and 
the other class plaintiffs were seeking individual relief 
under 29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(3) (in contrast to S 1132(a)(2), 
which only allows relief on behalf of the Plan), Meinhardt 
was required to prove individual losses. Varity Corp. v. 
Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 507-15 (1996). 
 
Although the District Court's discussion of Meinhardt's 
claims that Unisys breached its duty to disclose 
information about Executive Life spans 18 pages, we can 
dispose of this issue on appeal briefly. Essentially, 
Meinhardt complains that Unisys received reports about 
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Executive Life's financial troubles in early 1990. Meinhardt 
claims that Unisys (1) did not warn the Fund participants, 
(2) drafted misleading letters in order to dispel participants' 
concern, (3) did not disclose the fact that a high-level 
Unisys executive had purged his own portfolio of Executive 
Life securities, and (4) entered into an agreement with 
Executive Life not to disclose information to participants 
that would cause participants to change their investments.19 
The District Court held that Meinhardt did not prove that 
the alleged failures to disclose were material. CL PP 22-23. 
 
We need not address the question of whether the alleged 
nondisclosures were material, however, because it is clear 
that Meinhardt did not prove that any alleged failures to 
disclose caused the participants to suffer damages. 
CL PP 29-30. The District Court found that Meinhardt and 
the other class plaintiffs (1) already had actual knowledge 
of much of the information it is claimed that Unisys failed 
to disclose, (2) did not read the Plan documents, and (3) 
testified that they would not have withdrawn or transferred 
their money from the Fund even if they had known about 
Executive Life's problems. FF PP 70-71; CL P 28; App. 1681- 
82, 1688-89. 
 
Moreover, Meinhardt's expert, Tsetsekos, offered 
testimony on losses suffered as a result of the alleged 
failures to disclose, but referred only to those losses 
incurred by the Fund and not to any losses incurred by 
individual participants named as plaintiffs. FF PP 76-77; 
CL PP 29-31. Meinhardt also failed to prove individual 
damages suffered by each participant as ERISA requires. 29 
U.S.C. S 1132(a)(3). 
 
We hold that these factual findings of the District Court 
are not clearly erroneous and that they support the 
conclusion reached by the District Court that Meinhardt 
failed to prove his claim that Unisys breached its duty of 
disclosure. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. The agreement did not prevent Unisys from disclosing information 
required by law. App. 1702. 
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IX. 
 
A final word should be said about Meinhardt's claim for 
damages. First and foremost, in the absence of proof of a 
breach of fiduciary duty, no relief in the way of damages or 
losses could accrue to Meinhardt. We have held that Unisys 
satisfied ERISA's prudence standard and that accordingly, 
no breach of fiduciary duty occurred. This being so, no 
claim for increased interest, i.e., the promised interest 
minus the actual amount of interest received, or any other 
damages, can be sustained. As we have noted earlier, 
Meinhardt had received the return of the entire principal 
invested as well as some interest.20 
 
It is therefore irrelevant as to whether any losses 
sustained by the Fund from GIC investments could have 
been offset by any gains derived from other Fund 
investments. While we acknowledge that a trustee, when he 
is imprudent and breaches his trust, is liable for all gains 
and may not offset losses against them,21  in the instant 
case, the Unisys fiduciaries were neither imprudent nor did 
they breach their fiduciary duties.22  
 
Additionally, Meinhardt and the Department of Labor as 
amicus also argued that the burden of proving causation of 
damages shifts to the defendant after the plaintiff has 
proved that the defendant breached a fiduciary duty. Here, 
the District Court assigned the burden of proof to the 
plaintiff Meinhardt. Because we have held that Unisys did 
not breach its fiduciary duties, we have no need to address 
the issue of which party bears the burden of proving 
causation of damages resulting from a breach offiduciary 
duty. While we recognize that our sister circuits have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. Even without offsetting the losses with the gains, the three contracts 
each returned principal with minimal (3-5%) interest. FF P 80. 
 
21. See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 754 F.2d 1049, 1056 (2d Cir. 1985); 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts S 213. 
 
22. In light of our decision in favor of Unisys, we have no need to 
address Unisys's affirmative defense under 29 U.S.C. S 1104(c), which 
relieves a trustee of liability if the loss results from the participant's 
exercise of control. 
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divided in deciding this question,23 we have yet to express 
ourselves on this issue.24 
 
X. 
 
In sum, we have held that: 
 
(1)    The District Court's findings of fact issued after 
       hearing evidence on Meinhardt's ERISA claims will be 
       affirmed as not clearly erroneous. 
 
(2)    The District Court's conclusions of law that the Unisys 
       fiduciaries were prudent, and in the alternative, that a 
       hypothetical prudent fiduciary would have made the 
       same investments in Executive Life GICs, also will be 
       affirmed. 
 
(3)    Although we do not agree with the District Court's 
       additional discussion of an arbitrary and capricious 
       standard in reviewing the investments made by the 
       ERISA fiduciaries, this discussion was superfluous, 
       constitutes no more than harmless error, and does not 
       affect our judgment. 
 
(4)    The District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
       excluding the testimony of Meinhardt's proposed expert 
       witness on the issue of Unisys's prudence, and in any 
       event, that action was harmless in light of the District 
       Court's finding that the expert was not credible. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. Compare Silverman v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 138 F.3d 98, 105- 
06 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, ___ S. Ct. ___, 1998 WL 440027 (Oct. 5, 
1998) and Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1459-60 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(burden of proof on plaintiff) with McDonald v. Provident Indemnity Life 
Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1995); Roth v. Sawyer-Cleator 
Lumber Co., 16 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 1994) (burden of proof on 
fiduciary defendant). 
 
24. Cf. Kemmerer v. ICI Americas, Inc., 70 F.3d 281, 290 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(citing Roth for the proposition that burden of disproving damages shifts 
to the trustee, but finding no need to shift the burden because the case 
before the court did not involve a situation where plaintiff had proved a 
breach of duty and a definite loss); Nedd v. United Mine Workers of Am., 
556 F.2d 190, 211 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding that shifting the burden of 
causation to the fiduciary is an appropriate rule in an LMRA case). 
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(5)    The District Court did not err in denying relief to 
       Meinhardt inasmuch as no losses or damages could be 
       sustained. As a consequence, we have found it 
       unnecessary to address the disputed issue of which 
       party bears the burden of proving causation of 
       damages that result from a breach of fiduciary duty. 
 
(6)    The District Court did not err in holding that 
       Meinhardt's other ERISA claims, failure to diversify 
       and failure to disclose information, were not proved. 
 
Thus, we will affirm the District Court's orders of November 
24, 1997, and January 9, 1998, in favor of Unisys and 
against Meinhardt. 
 
Each party shall bear its own costs. 
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BECKER, Chief Judge, dissenting 
 
Although I join in Parts I through V and VII through IX 
of the majority's opinion, I believe that the majority has 
made a significant error regarding expert testimony, and I 
dissent on this point. Because I believe that this error is 
not harmless, I believe we should vacate the judgment and 
remand this case for a new trial. 
 
In concluding that the District Court properly excluded 
the testimony of Dr. Gottheimer, the majority seriously 
misconceives the proper approach to the admission of 
expert opinion testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 
702. As an initial point, the majority overstates the degree 
to which we owe deference to the District Court's decision 
in a case, such as this, tried to the court. The District 
Court's decision deserves no additional deference simply 
because the court sat as both evidentiary gate-keeper and 
fact-finder. If anything, the practicalities of the matter 
suggest that the trial court in such a situation should be 
more reluctant than usual to exclude evidence, although I 
do not suggest that we should apply a correspondingly 
more stringent standard of review. 
 
The District Court and the majority also make three 
important errors in analyzing the substantive requirements 
of Rule 702. First, the majority confuses the reliability of an 
expert witness -- a matter for the jury -- with the reliability 
of his or her methodology -- a matter initially for the trial 
judge -- and therefore erroneously concludes that 
questions about an expert witness's general credibility are 
a proper basis for excluding his or her testimony. The 
question for the judge under Rule 702 is not whether the 
witness is reliable but whether the methodology the expert 
uses in reaching his conclusions is reliable. As to this latter 
point, the witness's general credibility is simply irrelevant; 
the relevant issues in determining the reliability of an 
expert's principles and methods are of the sort set forth 
with respect to scientific testimony in Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-95 (1993). 
 
Second, the majority misconstrues the nature of the 
requirement of "fit" between the expert's testimony and the 
facts at issue. The majority concludes that the District 
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Court correctly found that no fit exists in this case because 
Dr. Gottheimer's experience, in the area of property- 
casualty insurance, on which his testimony is based, is not 
in the specific area -- life insurance -- with which the facts 
in this case deal. But the majority's focus on the connection 
between Dr. Gottheimer's claimed basis for being an expert 
and the facts at issue, as opposed to the connection 
between the substance of his testimony and the facts, is 
irrelevant to the question of fit. Their concern about his 
background should more appropriately be directed at Dr. 
Gottheimer's qualifications, not the fit between his 
testimony and the facts. 
 
Third, the majority permits the District Court to set the 
qualifications bar for expert testimony too high. It approves 
the District Court's rejection of the expert's testimony 
simply because his qualifications are not of the"highest 
caliber." This conclusion is inconsistent with our 
longstanding liberal approach to the matter of expert 
witness qualifications. Also, the connection between Dr. 
Gottheimer's expertise and the issues in this case-- which 
the majority discusses in the context of fit -- are not too 
remote for him to qualify as an expert under Rule 702. 
 
Finally, I think that the majority wrongly concludes that 
any error in the exclusion of Dr. Gottheimer's testimony 
was harmless. While improper admission of evidence is 
usually harmless error in a bench trial, the improper 
exclusion of an expert witness who would have offered a 
party's sole expert testimony on an element of its case 
ordinarily is not harmless. The fact that the District Court 
found some inconsistencies in Dr. Gottheimer's voir dire 
testimony was not a sufficient basis for changing the 
ordinary rule. Such inconsistencies are not enough to 
convince me that it is highly probable that Dr. Gottheimer's 
testimony, if admitted, would not have changed the 
outcome. This is especially true in light of the fact that the 
inconsistencies the District Court discusses were at worst 
minor. 
 
I. Overview of Rule 702 
 
Under Rule 702, "[i]f scientific, technical, or other 
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specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise." Fed. R. Evid. 702. The 
Supreme Court has recognized that Rule 702 , although it 
limits the scope of permissible evidence, is part of "the 
`liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules and their `general 
approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to "opinion" 
testimony.' " Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588 (quoting Beech 
Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)). We have 
recognized that this "principle of liberal admission of expert 
testimony is found in Rule 702 itself, in the advisory 
committee note to the rule, and in our case law."1 
 
To these ends, Rule 702 embodies three distinct 
substantive restrictions on the admission of expert 
testimony: qualifications, reliability and fit. See In re Paoli 
R.R. Yard PCB Litig. ("Paoli II"), 35 F.3d 717, 741-43 (3d 
Cir. 1994). First, an expert witness must be qualified by 
virtue of specialized expertise. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 
(permitting expert testimony of a witness "qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education"); Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 741. Second, "an expert's 
testimony is admissible so long as the process or technique 
the expert used in formulating the opinion is reliable." Paoli 
II, 35 F.3d at 742 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-90). 
Third, "[e]xpert testimony which does not relate to any 
issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful." 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (citations omitted).2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Habecker v. Copperloy Corp., 893 F.2d 49, 51 (3d Cir. 1990); accord 
Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 625 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing the "policy of 
liberal admissibility of expert testimony"); Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S. 
Co., 80 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing"our liberal approach to 
admitting expert testimony"); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 
1230 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing "the liberal standard of admissibility 
mandated by Rule 702"); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 88 (3d 
Cir. 1979). 
 
2. It is not a settled question in this Circuit whether the Daubert 
requirements apply to nonscientific testimony such as may be at issue 
here. See Lauria v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 145 F.3d 593, 599 n.7 
(3d Cir. 1998) (questioning, but not resolving, whether Daubert analysis 
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II. Standard of Review 
 
As an initial matter, I think the majority errs in its 
analysis of the applicable standard of review and the extent 
to which we owe deference to the District Court's decision. 
Of course, the decision whether to admit or exclude expert 
testimony is largely within the hands of the trial judge. We 
review such a decision for abuse of discretion. See General 
Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512, 517 (1997) ("We have 
held that abuse of discretion is the proper standard of 
review of a district court's evidentiary rulings." (citations 
omitted)); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. ("Paoli I"), 916 
F.2d 829, 856 & n.33 (3d Cir. 1990). The standard does not 
change when we are reviewing a court's decision to exclude, 
as opposed to admit, expert testimony, in spite of the liberal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
should apply to testimony of expert in train track maintenance); United 
States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844, 850 (3d Cir. 1995) (questioning the 
propriety of applying Daubert to handwriting analysis, but applying it in 
an exercise of caution). This question is currently before the Supreme 
Court. See Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 
1997), cert. granted sub nom. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 118 S. Ct. 
2339 (1998). The current proposed amendment to Rule 702 would apply 
a distillation of the Daubert analysis to all expert testimony. See Fed. 
R. 
Evid. 702 (proposed amendment 1998) (further limiting admissibility of 
expert testimony to where "(1) the testimony is sufficiently based upon 
reliable facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles 
and methods reliably to the facts"). 
 
The majority contends that I have erred by focusing on Daubert 
analysis in a case in which it might not apply. See Slip Op. at 23. But 
even to the extent the majority turns out to be correct that a strict 
Daubert analysis does not apply, my conclusions would not change. 
First, I do not believe that the result would be any different if we were 
to apply the principles of Rule 702 sans Daubert. In fact, since Daubert 
imposes additional requirements for scientific testimony beyond the 
usual requirements for expert testimony, not applying Daubert would 
provide even greater reason to believe that Dr. Gottheimer's testimony 
should have been admitted. Thus, the majority's criticism supports my 
contention. Second, even if the Supreme Court in Kumho decides that 
strict Daubert analysis should not apply to non-scientific testimony, I 
still think that the basic principles of reliability and fit would be 
relevant 
in determining the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702. 
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standard for the admission of such testimony. See Joiner, 
118 S. Ct. at 517. 
 
Even though we apply an abuse of discretion standard of 
review, however, "to the extent the district court's ruling 
turns on an interpretation of a Federal Rule of Evidence our 
review is plenary."3 Furthermore, although our review is 
highly deferential, it is not a complete bar to reversing a 
district court's decision even where the court does not 
commit purely legal error. See, e.g., Paoli I, 916 F.2d at 
855-56 (rejecting as an abuse of discretion the trial court's 
insistence on certain credentials as expert qualifications); 4 
Weinstein's Federal Evidence S 702.02(2) n.9 (2d ed. Nov. 
1998) (collecting cases). 
 
The majority concludes that the fact that this case 
involved a bench trial requires additional deference to the 
District Court's evidentiary exclusion decision. In reaching 
this conclusion, the majority relies on Goodman v. 
Highlands Insurance Co., 607 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1979), 
which states that "a trial judge sitting without a jury is 
entitled to even greater latitude concerning the admission 
or exclusion of evidence." Goodman, 607 F.2d at 668. The 
majority asserts that, after Joiner -- in which the Supreme 
Court held that the same abuse of discretion standard of 
review applies to an evidentiary ruling on expert testimony 
regardless of whether the trial court admits or excludes the 
evidence -- the "Goodman" rule "has been given increased 
viability." Slip Op. at 20. For a variety of reasons, I cannot 
agree with the majority's conclusion that our review is 
affected by the fact that this case was tried to the court. 
 
As an initial matter, Goodman does not support the 
meaning the majority draws from it. The statement in 
Goodman upon which the majority relies refers not to the 
trial court's decision on admissibility but to whether the 
trial court's decision, if erroneous, was a harmless error. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 944 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(citing In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 277 & 
n.43 (3d Cir. 1983), revd. on other grounds sub. nom. Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)); accord Barker v. 
Deere & Co., 60 F.3d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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This reading is made manifest by an examination of the 
sentence following that quoted above: 
 
       In a non-jury case, the admission of incompetent 
       evidence will not warrant reversal unless all of the 
       competent evidence is insufficient to support the 
       judgment, or unless it affirmatively appears that the 
       incompetent evidence induced the court to make an 
       essential finding which would otherwise not have been 
       made. 
 
Goodman, 607 F.2d at 668 (citations omitted). This is 
simply a restatement of the familiar harmless error test for 
review of decisions admitting evidence in bench trials.4 It is, 
however, irrelevant to our determination of whether the 
district court's decision to exclude expert testimony from 
evidence is reversible error.5 
 
Furthermore, even assuming the majority correctly states 
the Fifth Circuit's Goodman rule, I think that rule is not a 
proper one and would not follow it. The Federal Rules of 
Evidence apply with full force to bench trials. See Fed. R. 
Evid. 1101(b); 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. As we have stated: 
 
       [I]t is well settled that in a nonjury case, an appellate court 
will not 
       reverse on the basis of an erroneous admission of evidence unless 
       (1) there is insufficient evidence other than the challenged 
evidence 
       to support the district court's conclusion, or (2) the district 
court is 
       induced by the challenged evidence to make an essential finding 
       that it would not have made otherwise. 
 
United States v. Local 560, Intl. Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 278 
(3d Cir. 1985) (alteration in original) (quoting De Laval Turbine, Inc. v. 
West India Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 259, 263-64 (3d Cir. 1974)); accord 12 
Rya W. Zobel, Moore's Federal Practice S 61.06(2) (3d ed. 1998). This is 
a sensible rule based on the assumption that judges are more capable 
of ignoring prejudicial or irrelevant evidence than juries. See 1 
Weinstein's, supra, S 103.41(4)(a) ("At one end of the scale is the non- 
jury trial in which the judge is often assumed, even in a criminal case, 
to have disregarded inadmissible evidence in arriving at a decision."). 
 
5. Recent cases from the same court reveal that the quoted portion of 
Goodman in fact refers to harmless error analysis. See, e.g., Southern 
Pac. Transp. Co. v. Chabert, 973 F.2d 441, 448 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting 
Goodman and citing it in support of the harmless error standard). 
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Federal Practice & Procedure S 2411, at 587 (2d ed. 1995) 
("In theory, the Federal Rules of Evidence apply equally in 
court trials and jury trials."). After all, a trial is a trial. To 
me, the proposition that we owe more deference to trial 
court decisions excluding evidence in bench trials is 
inconsistent with the Federal Rules and encourages sloppy 
district court decisionmaking.6 
 
If anything, trial courts should be more chary of 
excluding evidence in bench trials than in jury trials. See 
Builders Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 179 F.2d 377, 379 (8th 
Cir. 1950) ("[A] trial judge who, in the trial of a nonjury 
case, attempts to make strict rulings on the admissibility of 
evidence, can easily get his decision reversed by excluding 
evidence which is objected to, but which, on review, the 
appellate court believes should have been admitted."), 
quoted in 9 Wright & Miller, supra, S 2411, at 587. The 
better course is to admit the evidence and then take factors 
that otherwise might affect its admissibility into 
consideration in determining its weight, rather than waste 
time debating the propriety of admitting the evidence.7 I 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The majority suggests that I have failed to recognize the critical fact 
in 
this case: that the judge was the fact-finder as well as the Rule 702 
gatekeeper. The majority is incorrect. Of course I recognize this fact, 
but 
think that it should make no difference in our analysis. The majority 
essentially contends that, once the trial judge in a bench trial makes up 
his or her mind during an in limine hearing that a witness is not 
credible, that decision is cast in concrete and the judge will close his 
or 
her ears to any further (trial) testimony from the witness. Concomitantly, 
the majority suggests that, with any witness, the court proceeding to a 
bench trial may exclude a prospective witness's testimony based not on 
its admissibility but on the witness's credibility. See Slip Op. at 23 
("We 
would be hard pressed to require a District Court judge sitting in a non- 
jury case who credibly and with reason found that he could not believe 
a witness to nevertheless hear the witness's direct examination, cross- 
examination, and rebuttal examination in an extended trial when he 
knew that he would only reject it as unbelievable."). I, to the contrary, 
think it would be preferable for the trial judge to listen to the witness 
and keep his or her mind open to the possibility that the entirety of the 
witness's trial testimony could change his or her view of the witness's 
credibility. Listening, after all, is a major part of the judge's job. 
 
7. See Builders Steel, 179 F.2d at 379 (quoting Donnelly Garment Co. v. 
NLRB, 123 F.2d 215, 224 (8th Cir. 1941)). In Donnelly Garment, the 
court noted that it is usually more efficient in a bench trial for the 
court 
to simply admit questionable evidence, and then take such questions 
into consideration in determining the weight it should be given. See 123 
F.2d at 224. 
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believe the majority's approach grants undue deference to 
trial court's decisions excluding evidence in bench trials. 
 
III. Rule 702 Requirements 
 
I now turn to the substantive requirements of Rule 702. 
Under Rule 702, expert testimony is admissible only if it 
meets the requirements of Rule 702: qualifications, 
reliability and fit. The majority concludes that the District 
Court properly found that Dr. Gottheimer's testimony met 
none of these requirements. I disagree, and discuss each of 
these factors, although not in the usual order. 
 
A. Reliability 
 
The majority begins with the indisputable premise that 
reliability is a key factor in determining the admissibility of 
expert testimony. "[U]nder the Rules the trial judge must 
ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence 
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." Joiner, 118 S. 
Ct. at 517 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589). From this, 
the majority concludes that, as part of the reliability 
analysis, a trial court may consider the general credibility 
of a witness in determining whether his or her testimony is 
appropriately admitted as expert witness testimony. See 
Slip Op. at 20 ("Thus in our view, the Court's emphasis on 
reliability as well as on relevancy embraces within its 
standard the credibility of the witness proffering expert 
opinion."). Accordingly, the majority holds that, since the 
District Court found that Dr. Gottheimer was not a credible 
witness it could properly exclude his expert testimony 
under Rule 702. The majority misconceives the 
fundamental nature of the reliability inquiry under Daubert. 
The reliability inquiry focuses not on the witness's 
reliability in an evidentiary sense, but on the reliability of 
the methodology that the expert applies in arriving at an 
opinion. 
 
       [I]n order to qualify as "scientific knowledge," an 
       inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific 
       method. Proposed testimony must be supported by 
       appropriate validation -- i.e., "good grounds," based on 
       what is known. In short, the requirement that an 
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       expert's testimony pertain to "scientific knowledge" 
       establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability. 
 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 (footnote omitted). This inquiry 
focuses on the expert's principles and methodology, not his 
results. 
 
        The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, 
       a flexible one. Its overarching subject is the scientific 
       validity -- and thus the evidentiary relevance and 
       reliability -- of the principles that underlie the 
       proposed submission. The focus, of course, must be 
       solely on principles and methodology, not on the 
       conclusions that they generate. 
 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95. Under Rule 702, the trial 
court's preliminary reliability analysis in making an 
admissibility determination must focus on the witness's 
methods, not his or her testimony as a whole.8 A current 
proposed amendment to Rule 702 reemphasizes this focus 
on the reliability of the methodology, as opposed to the 
witness.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Even the broadest understandings of the Daubert reliability inquiry 
recognize that such reliability determinations are limited to the 
witness's 
methods and related matters. "The broadest reading of Daubert is that it 
applies to all reliability issues presented by all expert testimony. Under 
this interpretation, all reliability issues raised by an expert's 
application, 
methodology, reasoning, or underlying theories are admissibility 
questions to be resolved by the gatekeeper-judge." 29 Charles Alan 
Wright & Victor James Gold, Federal Practice & Procedure S 6266, at 290 
(1997). 
 
9. The Judicial Conference of the United States's Standing Committee on 
Rules of Practice and Procedure is currently considering an amendment 
to Rule 702 proposed by its Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence 
that would permit the admission of expert testimony if "(1) the testimony 
is sufficiently based upon reliable facts or data, (2) the testimony is 
the 
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has 
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts." Fed. R. Evid. 
702 (proposed amendment 1998). Under the proposed rule, the trial 
judge must determine whether the proposed testimony"is properly 
grounded, well-reasoned and not speculative before it can be admitted." 
Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee's note (proposed amendment 
1998). "If there is a well-accepted body of learning and experience in the 
expert's field, then the expert's testimony must be grounded in that 
learning and experience to be reliable, and the expert must explain how 
the conclusion is so grounded." Id. 
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Credibility plays no appropriate part in the analysis of 
the reliability of a proposed expert's methodology. The 
Court in Daubert recognized a number of factors pertinent 
to the reliability inquiry, including testability, peer review or 
publication, potential rate of error, existence of standards 
and controls, and general acceptance. See 509 U.S. at 593- 
94. We, as well as others, have suggested numerous 
additional factors relevant to reliability as set forth in the 
margin.10 The key point is that none of these factors 
requires consideration of the proffered expert's credibility in 
general. "[E]valuating the reliability of scientific 
methodologies and data does not generally involve 
assessing the truthfulness of the expert witnesses . . . ." 
Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 749.11 Of course, a particular witness 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. See, e.g., Downing, 753 F.2d at 1238-39 (listing additional factors: 
novelty, specialized literature, and non-judicial uses of techniques); 
Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 519 (whether the expert has unjustifiably 
extrapolated from an accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion); 
Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir.) 
(whether "the expert is being as careful as he would be in his regular 
professional work outside his paid litigation consulting"), cert. denied, 
117 S. Ct. 2480 (1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 
1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995) ("whether the experts are proposing to testify 
about matters growing naturally and directly out of research they have 
conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have developed 
their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying"); Claar v. Burlington 
N.R.R. Co., 29 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1994) (whether the expert has 
adequately accounted for obvious alternative explanations). 
 
11. Courts have held in numerous other cases that credibility is 
irrelevant to determining whether a proposed expert witness's testimony 
is admissible under Rule 702, and particularly whether it is based on 
reliable methodology. See, e.g., Breidor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 
F.2d 1134, 1138-39 (3d Cir. 1983) ("Where there is a logical basis for an 
expert's opinion testimony, the credibility and weight of that testimony 
is 
to be determined by the jury, not the trial judge."); see also Kannankeril 
v. Terminix Intl., Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 809 (3d Cir. 1997) ("If the expert 
meets liberal minimum qualifications [under Rule 702], then the level of 
the expert's expertise goes to credibility and weight, not 
admissibility."). 
For example, expert witnesses cannot be excluded on the basis of bias. 
See, e.g., Marshall v. Perez Arzuaga, 828 F.2d 845, 851-52 (1st Cir. 
1987); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1135-36 
(5th Cir. 1985). Similarly, factual errors in a witness's testimony are 
not 
grounds for excluding the witness from testifying as an expert. See Paoli 
II, 35 F.3d at 753-54. Finally, general attacks on credibility based on a 
lack of personal knowledge are not a proper basis for excluding expert 
testimony. See Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 580 
(5th Cir. 1985). 
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can lie about whether one of the factors mentioned above is 
present. But the witness's general credibility -- i.e., 
credibility based on matters not directly related to these 
factors, such as bias or unrelated prior inconsistent 
statements -- is not relevant to a trial court's preliminary 
determination that these factors are present. These factors 
are relatively objective matters that the court can generally 
analyze independent of the witness's testimony about them. 
For example, a court is fully capable of determining 
whether a theory or method is testable. 
 
Furthermore, permitting the trial court to consider the 
general credibility of an expert witness in its analysis of the 
reliability of proposed expert opinion testimony improperly 
trenches on the province of the fact-finder. The fact-finder 
is ordinarily the arbiter of general credibility. Rule 702 is 
intended not to impinge on the authority of the fact-finder 
in making credibility determinations, but rather to ensure 
that the fact-finders' ability to find facts independently is 
not overwhelmed by complex and authoritative-seeming 
expert testimony. See 29 Wright & Gold , supra, S 6262, at 
179 ("If the trier of fact is unable or disinclined to question 
the expert's opinion, it surrenders its central function to an 
expert whose testimony may be unreliable."). In order to 
avoid this eventuality, Rule 702 provides for a preliminary 
inquiry into whether proposed expert testimony is the kind 
that is appropriately admitted into evidence, i.e., that the 
method is reliable and based on expertise. See id. at 183- 
84. But this inquiry cannot extend into matters that are the 
proper province of the fact-finder, such as general 
credibility. See id. at 184 ("Importantly, however, Rule 702 
on its face creates no general power in the trial judge to 
exclude expert testimony on the grounds that it is 
unreliable."). 
 
This limitation on the power of the trial court to admit 
and exclude expert testimony rests on sound policy 
considerations. First, it is emblematic of the Rules' 
generally liberal approach to the admissibility of evidence, 
discussed above. See supra Part I. Second, it reflects the 
fact that the power to evaluate witness's credibility lies 
traditionally with the fact-finder, not the trial court making 
evidentiary rulings. See 29 Wright & Gold, supra, S 6262, at 
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185 ("[T]he power to evaluate the credibility of witnesses 
and give testimony its proper weight primarily resides with 
the trier of fact."). 
 
Finally, it rests on the general assumption underlying the 
Federal Rules of Evidence as a whole: the fact-finder is best 
situated to determine the credibility of witnesses. See id. at 
185 ("[J]uries generally have the ability to accurately weight 
and evaluate witness credibility."). "Accordingly, the most 
common judicial response to attacks on the reliability of 
expert testimony is that such matters go to weight, not 
admissibility." Id. at 185-86. The Court in Daubert 
recognized the importance of leaving such matters to the 
fact-finder, and not determining them on evidentiary 
grounds: 
 
       Respondent expresses apprehension that abandonment 
       of "general acceptance" as the exclusive requirement 
       for admission will result in a "free-for-all" in which 
       befuddled juries are confounded by absurd and 
       irrational pseudoscientific assertions. In this regard 
       respondent seems to us to be overly pessimistic about 
       the capabilities of the jury and of the adversary system 
       generally. Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of 
       contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden 
       of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of 
       attacking shaky but admissible evidence. 
 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595-96 (citation omitted; emphasis 
added). 
 
Accordingly, I conclude that the District Court erred to 
the extent that it considered Dr. Gottheimer's general 
credibility as a factor in determining whether the principles 
and methodology underlying his proposed expert testimony 
were reliable under Rule 702. This result is unaffected by 
the fact that the District Court -- post hoc -- went ahead 
and made credibility findings that arguably would have 
resulted in his rejection of Dr. Gottheimer's testimony in its 
role as fact-finder. I deal with this aspect of the matter in 
my discussion of harmless error. See infra Part IV. 
Questions about Dr. Gottheimer's credibility should have 
been left for substantive fact-finding, not evidentiary 
rulings. Since the District Court and Unisys suggest no 
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other concerns about the reliability requirement, I would 
conclude that Dr. Gottheimer's proposed testimony satisfies 
it. 
 
B. Fit 
 
The majority also concludes that the District Court 
properly found that Dr. Gottheimer's testimony did not fit 
with the question in issue at the trial. In particular, the 
majority concludes that Dr. Gottheimer's experience and 
knowledge lay in a field not sufficiently connected with the 
question at issue to meet the requirement of fit."Dr. 
Gottheimer's alleged expertise, limited in any event to 
methods of investing with respect to property casualty 
insurance, did not fit with or meet the need of the District 
Court for expert testimony in life insurance investing." Slip 
Op. at 21. The majority misconceives the requirement of fit 
under Rule 702. 
 
The requirement of fit is essentially a relevance 
requirement. Under Rule 702, expert testimony is 
admissible if it "will assist the trier of fact." Fed. R. Evid. 
702. "This condition goes primarily to relevance." Daubert, 
509 U.S. at 591. "[A]dmission depends upon the `fit,' i.e., 
upon a specific proffer showing that scientific research has 
established" some point relevant to the facts of the case. 
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1226 (3d Cir. 
1985). We have further clarified this point: 
 
        An additional consideration under Rule 702 -- and 
       another aspect of relevancy -- is whether expert 
       testimony proffered in the case is sufficiently tied to the 
       facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a 
       factual dispute. In this regard, we hold that a 
       defendant who seeks the admission of expert testimony 
       must make an on-the-record detailed proffer to the 
       court, including an explanation of precisely how the 
       expert's testimony is relevant to the [factual issue] 
       under consideration. The offer of proof should establish 
       the presence of factors . . . which have been found by 
       researchers to [provide a basis for the proffered 
       opinion]. Failure to make such a detailed proffer is 
       sufficient grounds to exclude the expert's testimony. 
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753 F.2d at 1242 (citations omitted); see also Lauria v. 
National R.R. Passenger Corp., 145 F.3d 593, 600 (3d Cir. 
1998); United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844, 850 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
 
The majority errs in concluding that Dr. Gottheimer's 
field of expertise has any relevance to the fit inquiry. As the 
foregoing discussion of the fit requirement shows, it is 
satisfied if the proffered expert opinion is relevant to a 
factual issue before the fact-finder. The expert'sfield of 
expertise is irrelevant to an inquiry into the connection 
between the opinion itself and the issues in the case. A 
simple example shows this. In Lauria, a railroad worker 
slipped and was injured when he stepped on a loose 
railroad tie that was sitting between some tracks. "The 
primary issue [was] whether Amtrak was negligent in failing 
to remove a [railroad] tie from Lauria's workplace." Lauria, 
145 F.3d at 600. An expert opinion "that the tie was a 
dangerous obstruction that should have been discovered 
and removed and, . . . that Amtrak's negligence made the 
workplace unsafe" clearly satisfies the requirement of fit. 
145 F.3d at 600. 
 
But the expertise of the proponent of the opinion is 
irrelevant to this inquiry. This is true even if the witness 
proposing to testify to the above opinion is a medical doctor 
who has no experience with train tracks. Under the 
majority's reasoning, however, the doctor's testimony would 
not meet the fit requirement. Clearly, a medical doctor with 
no experience working with train tracks has no expertise 
with regard to the placement of loose railroad ties. If Dr. 
Gottheimer's testimony would not meet the fit requirement 
because his expertise lay in a different field of insurance 
than that in issue in the case, clearly the hypothetical 
doctor cannot provide testimony that meets the fit 
requirement. But the doctor's testimony should be excluded 
because of his lack of qualifications, not because of a 
supposed lack of fit. The proposed expert's expertise is 
simply irrelevant to determining whether the proffered 
expert opinion is relevant to issues in the case. 
 
As this example shows, the majority's and the District 
Court's concerns about the connection between Dr. 
Gottheimer's expertise and the issues in the case are 
 
                                43 
  
actually relevant to the step of the Rule 702 inquiry which 
I consider infra: qualifications. Under Rule 702, a witness 
can offer an expert opinion if he or she is "qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education." Fed. R. Evid. 702. The nature of a witness's 
specific field of expertise is part of the expert's background 
that is considered in determining whether a witness is 
qualified. See Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 741. 12 
 
I think a proper fit inquiry would show that Dr. 
Gottheimer's testimony meets the fit requirement. Plaintiffs' 
counsel said that Dr. Gottheimer would have testified that 
certain standard tests exist in the insurance industry to 
analyze the financial condition of insurance companies, and 
that he was familiar with those tests. He would have 
further testified that he performed these tests on Executive 
Life data, and concluded "that the tests set up certain red 
flags that should have caused a person familiar with the 
tests and performing the tests, to ask further questions 
about the solvency and the credit worthiness of Executive 
Life." I think this is the kind of "on-the-record detailed 
proffer" that we required in Downing, "including an 
explanation of precisely how the expert's testimony is 
relevant to" determining whether Unisys acted prudently. 
Downing, 753 F.2d at 1242. Accordingly, I would conclude 
that Dr. Gottheimer's proposed testimony meets thefit 
requirement. The nature of Dr. Gottheimer's expertise, and 
its connection with the factual issues in this case, are 
relevant only to the Rule 702 inquiry into qualifications, to 
which I now turn. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. In fact, the case the majority cites in support of its conclusion that 
Dr. Gottheimer's testimony does not meet the fit requirement involved an 
inquiry into the witness's qualifications, not thefit between his proposed 
testimony and the issues in that case. See Surace v. Caterpillar, Inc., 
111 
F.3d 1039 (3d Cir. 1997). In Surace, the plaintiff offered the testimony 
of 
an electromechanical engineer concerning workers' habituation to 
auditory warning devices. The district court excluded Brink's testimony 
and we affirmed, noting that the expert's experience was limited to 
mechanical, as opposed to human, factors in design, and he therefore 
was not qualified to testify about the latter. See 111 F.3d at 1055-56. 
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C. Qualifications 
 
The majority also concludes that the District Court 
properly excluded Dr. Gottheimer's testimony because he 
was not qualified as an expert with respect to the issues in 
this case. Specifically, the majority adopts the District 
Court's conclusion that Dr. Gottheimer was not qualified 
because his "qualifications were less than stellar." Slip Op. 
at 21. The District Court noted that "Dr. Gottheimer claims 
a doctoral degree from a correspondence school, an 
additional ground for my refusal to qualify him as an 
expert." In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., No. 91-3067, 1997 WL 
732473, at *26 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 1997). In addition, as 
discussed above, see supra section III.B, the majority 
concludes that the District Court properly rejected Dr. 
Gottheimer's testimony because his field of expertise was 
not sufficiently connected to the issues in the case. "Dr. 
Gottheimer's experience in the insurance area was limited 
to property casualty insurance and not life insurance." 
Unisys, 1997 WL 732473, at *22. Neither of these are 
appropriate grounds for excluding an expert witness for 
lack of qualifications. 
 
The requirement that an expert witness be qualified is 
well established. A witness may only provide expert 
testimony to the extent that he or she is "qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education." Fed. R. Evid. 702. The bases for concluding 
that a witness is qualified are flexible. "[I]nsistence on a 
certain kind of degree or background is inconsistent with 
our jurisprudence in this area." Paoli I, 916 F.2d at 855; 
accord Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 626 (3d Cir. 1998) 
("[I]n considering the qualification of witnesses as experts, 
we stress that ordinarily an otherwise qualified witness is 
not disqualified merely because of a lack of academic 
training."); Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 741 ("We have eschewed 
imposing overly rigorous requirements of expertise and 
have been satisfied with more generalized qualifications."). 
A particular educational background is unnecessary; 
practical experience is sufficient to conclude that a witness 
is qualified as an expert. See Lauria, 145 F.3d at 599 (citing 
American Tech. Resources v. United States, 893 F.2d 651, 
656 (3d Cir. 1990)). "Following this logic, it is an abuse of 
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discretion to exclude testimony simply because the trial 
court does not deem the proposed expert to be the best 
qualified or because the proposed expert does not have the 
specialization that the court considers most appropriate."13 
 
Although, as always with evidentiary questions, we apply 
a deferential standard of review to a trial court's 
determination of whether a proposed expert is qualified, we 
have on numerous occasions found that a district court 
abused its discretion in excluding a proffered expert 
because of his or her qualifications. Some of these cases 
are summarized in the margin.14 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Holbrook, 80 F.3d at 782 (citing Paoli I, 916 F.2d at 856); accord 
Kannankeril, 128 F.3d at 809 ("Whether the appellants' expert might 
have done a better job is not the test."); Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 741 
("[E]xclusion was not the proper remedy `simply because the experts did 
not have the degree or training which the district court apparently 
thought would be most appropriate.' " (quoting Paoli I, 916 F.2d at 856)). 
 
14. See Lauria, 145 F.3d at 599 ("Slavin's twenty years of experience 
with track equipment, maintenance, and safety procedures qualified him 
as an expert who could testify as to Amtrak's responsibility to inspect 
and maintain the track in a safe condition," even though he did not have 
particularized training other than that which anyone who had done such 
work for twenty years would have); Holbrook, 80 F.3d at 781-82 
(reversing exclusion of treating physician's testimony as to whether 
plaintiff 's cancer was mesothelioma; district court had reasoned that 
doctor was not qualified because he was not an oncologist; stating that 
trial court erroneously "restricted Dr. Carpenter's testimony based on a 
requirement that the witness practice a particular specialty to testify 
concerning certain matters"); Paoli I, 916 F.2d at 856 (district court 
excluded witnesses who would have testified about gas chromatography 
tests and differential diagnoses, because they lacked degrees in 
chemistry and medicine respectively: "In light of the liberal Rule 702 
expert qualification standard, we hold that the district court abused its 
discretion in excluding portions of [the experts'] testimony simply 
because the experts did not have the degree or training which the 
district court apparently thought would be most appropriate." (footnote 
omitted)); Habecker, 893 F.2d at 52-53 (concluding that district court 
abused its discretion when it excluded expert testimony concerning 
connection between lack of operator restraints and plaintiff's injury, 
where plaintiff was injured when he was thrown from the cab of a fork- 
lift; district court's sole reason for finding expert was not qualified 
was 
because he lacked an engineering degree); Knight, 596 F.2d at 88 
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Supported by these cases, I believe that Dr. Gottheimer 
was in fact qualified to offer the expert testimony proffered, 
and that the District Court's conclusion to the contrary was 
an abuse of discretion. The District Court found that Dr. 
Gottheimer was not qualified on two grounds: the nature of 
his educational credentials and the distinction between his 
experience in property-casualty insurance companies and 
the issues in the case involving life insurance companies. In 
light of the case law discussed in the margin above, both of 
these findings are inconsistent with the exercise of sound 
discretion. 
 
The District Court concluded that Dr. Gottheimer could 
not be qualified because his doctorate was awarded by a 
correspondence school. If this were plaintiffs' sole basis for 
claiming that Dr. Gottheimer was qualified, I would 
probably agree with the District Court. It was not, however. 
Rather, the record discloses numerous grounds on which to 
conclude that Dr. Gottheimer was qualified as an expert. 
Dr. Gottheimer's resume demonstrates his expertise 
through three distinct areas: experience, education and 
teaching. First, he has worked for a dozen years as a 
consultant in the insurance industry, following thirty years 
of employment by various insurance companies. His 
consulting work has included analyses of both property- 
casualty and life insurance companies.15  Second, he has 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
(finding error in district court's exclusion of expert testimony 
concerning 
whether unguarded elevator control buttons were a design defect 
"because it believed that such expertise would require some background 
in the design and manufacture of elevators," which proposed expert 
lacked; noting our "reluctance to require highly particularized, sub- 
specialization on the part of experts"). 
 
15. The District Court held that Dr. Gottheimer was not qualified 
because his experience lay largely in the area of property-casualty 
insurance, not life insurance, noting that Dr. Gottheimer testified that 
there were "fundamental differences" between the two. See 1997 WL 
732473, at *22. This conclusion contradicts our holdings in Knight and 
Holbrook, in which we reversed district courts' exclusions of experts 
whose expertise the trial courts concluded was not sufficiently 
specialized. As we emphasized in those cases, we are reluctant "to 
require highly particularized, sub-specialization on the part of experts." 
Knight, 596 F.2d at 88; accord Holbrook, 80 F.3d at 782. Any differences 
between the two areas "should go to the weight, and not the 
admissibility, of [the expert's] opinion." Knight, 596 F.2d at 88. 
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bachelor's and master's degrees in insurance-relatedfields, 
as well as the a doctorate from a correspondence school.16 
He also possesses several professional affiliations in 
insurance professionals' organizations. Finally, Dr. 
Gottheimer has taught for over twenty-five years at the 
College of Insurance. The College of Insurance is an 
accredited, industry-sponsored school that offers classes in 
all aspects of insurance business. He is now on the full- 
time faculty there, and has taught courses in a variety of 
fields, including insurance company management. 
 
In light of these extensive qualifications, I have no doubt 
that Dr. Gottheimer was qualified and should have been 
permitted to testify as an expert under Rule 702. The 
District Court's decision to the contrary was an abuse of 
discretion. As the majority points out, the District Court 
refused to qualify Dr. Gottheimer because his qualifications 
"were not of the highest caliber." Slip Op. at 21. But in light 
of our longstanding jurisprudence, this is not an 
appropriate basis for excluding a proffered expert witness. 
See Kannankeril v. Terminix Intl., Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 809 
(3d Cir. 1997); Holbrook, 80 F.3d at 782; Paoli II, 35 F.3d 
at 741. Accordingly, I must conclude that the District Court 
abused its discretion in excluding his testimony on this 
basis. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. The District Court's focus on the nature of Dr. Gottheimer's doctorate 
and its consequent implicit dismissal of his other qualifications is also 
inconsistent with the exercise of sound discretion. If the district courts 
abused their discretion in Habecker, Paoli I and Lauria by insisting that 
the expert have a particular type of degree, the District Court in this 
case erred in insisting that the expert have not just a particular degree, 
but a degree from a particular kind of school. Cf. Lauria, 145 F.3d at 
599; Paoli I, 916 F.2d at 856. 
 
Furthermore, the District Court's reliance on Van Blargan v. Williams 
Hospitality Corp., 754 F. Supp. 246 (D.P.R. 1991), in discounting Dr. 
Gottheimer's degree is misplaced. In that case, the district court 
excluded an expert because, in addition to discounting his doctorate 
from a correspondence school, the court found that he had no other 
satisfactory qualifications. See Van Blargan, 754 F. Supp. at 248-49. 
Here, by contrast, Dr. Gottheimer has numerous other qualifications in 
addition to his doctorate. 
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For all these reasons, I think that Dr. Gottheimer should 
have been permitted to testify as an expert witness under 
Rule 702. As discussed above, Dr. Gottheimer fully met all 
three of the Rule 702 requirements: qualifications, 
reliability and fit. The only remaining question is whether 
that error was reversible or harmless error. 
 
IV. Harmless Error 
 
In the closing paragraph of its discussion of the Rule 702 
evidentiary issue, the majority concludes that, even if the 
District Court did commit an error in excluding Dr. 
Gottheimer's testimony, the error was harmless. In 
reaching this conclusion, it relies on the District Court's 
statement that it "could not find [Dr. Gottheimer] to be a 
credible witness given his evasiveness if not his propensity 
to state falsehoods." 1997 WL 732473, at * 26. The District 
Court pointed to a few alleged inconsistencies in Dr. 
Gottheimer's deposition and trial testimony in support of 
this conclusion. The majority concludes that, since the 
District Court would not have believed Dr. Gottheimer's 
testimony, his testimony could not have been given any 
weight if admitted. Thus its exclusion did not have a 
substantial effect on the outcome and any error in 
excluding it was harmless. Once again, I must disagree. 
 
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, an evidentiary error 
to which a party has raised a proper objection is not a 
grounds for reversal "unless a substantial right of the party 
is affected." Fed. R. Evid. 103(a); see also 28 U.S.C. S 2111; 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. An error is harmless, i.e., it does not 
affect a substantial right, only if "it is highly probable that 
the error did not contribute to the judgment." Murray v. 
United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 145 F.3d 143, 156 (3d Cir. 
1998) (citing McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 
916, 923-27 (3d Cir. 1985)). Although, as discussed above, 
the improper admission of evidence is usually harmless 
error in a bench trial, see supra Part II, the erroneous 
exclusion of evidence in a bench trial can be reversible error 
just as in a jury trial. See 11 Charles Alan Wright et al., 
Federal Practice & Procedure S 2885, at 454 (2d ed. 1995) 
("In nonjury cases the district court can commit reversible 
error by excluding evidence but it is almost impossible for 
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it to do so by admitting evidence." (footnote omitted)). Error 
is especially likely not to be harmless where the excluded 
expert was the only one a party offered to prove an 
essential element of its case.17 
 
In this case, Dr. Gottheimer was the only expert witness 
plaintiffs offered to prove that Unisys acted imprudently. 
His proffered testimony, set forth in the margin, was strong.18 
By excluding Dr. Gottheimer's testimony, the District Court 
deprived plaintiffs of their best evidence that Unisys 
breached its duty of prudence, a key element of his case. In 
light of our conclusion in Lauria and Holbrook, I cannot say 
that it is highly probable that the exclusion of Dr. 
Gottheimer did not affect the outcome of the trial. This is 
especially true in light of the other evidence admitted at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. See Lauria, 145 F.3d at 600 ("Finally, we note that because Slavin 
was the only witness originally offered to prove Amtrak's negligence with 
respect to the base tie, his exclusion from the trial did not constitute 
harmless error."); Holbrook, 80 F.3d at 787 (finding that the error in 
excluding plaintiff 's two doctors who were his only evidence regarding 
the type of cancer from which he suffered was not harmless); see also 
Habecker, 893 F.2d at 53 (finding that the error in excluding one of 
plaintiff 's two expert witnesses was not harmless where defendant 
proffered three experts on the same point). 
 
18. In particular, plaintiffs' attorney stated that, if he had been 
permitted 
to testify, Dr. Gottheimer's testimony would have been as follows: 
 
        We have offered [Dr. Gottheimer's] testimony to establish . . . 
that 
       in the insurance industry, there are some standard tools of tests 
       that are performed in conducting an analysis of thefinancial 
       condition of insurance companies, both life and health, and 
property 
       and casualty, in terms of ratios that are generated from the annual 
       statement, tests prescribed by the National Association of 
Insurance 
       Commissioners, and the Best leverage and liquidity and 
profitability 
       ratios. 
 
        The witness has performed these tests in his own capacity in the 
       past. He has performed them with respect to Executive Life, based 
       upon information that was available prior to the time of the three 
       bids in question. He is able to interpret the tests. He is familiar 
with 
       the tests. And his testimony would establish that the tests set up 
       certain red flags that should have caused a person familiar with 
the 
       tests and performing the tests to ask further questions about the 
       solvency and the credit worthiness of Executive Life. 
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trial, set forth in the margin.19 The District Court essentially 
decided all questions the evidence raised in favor of Unisys 
and concluded that Unisys acted prudently. Although I 
agree with the majority that, based on the admitted 
evidence, this conclusion was not clearly erroneous, this is 
to me an exceedingly close question. Accordingly, Dr. 
Gottheimer's testimony, if admitted, stood a good chance of 
changing this balance and consequently changing the 
decision of the District Court. 
 
That the District Court had questions about Dr. 
Gottheimer's credibility should not affect our harmless 
error analysis. The District Court's conclusion that it would 
not have found Dr. Gottheimer's testimony credible, based 
only on his voir dire testimony, is not sufficient grounds for 
concluding that exclusion of his testimony was harmless. I 
believe that there is a reasonable chance that, if the District 
Court had given Dr. Gottheimer the opportunity to present 
his testimony in full, it would have found him to be a 
credible witness. 
 
Our decisions in Lauria and Holbrook at least implicitly 
support this conclusion. In each of those cases, we reversed 
a district court decision excluding expert testimony on the 
grounds that the expert witness lacked the necessary 
qualifications. Such evidence goes to the weight, not the 
admissibility, of the expert testimony. See Kannankeril, 128 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. The evidence on Unisys's prudence admitted at trial included 
primarily the testimony of White and Level, two Unisys executives 
charged with responsibility for the Funds, and Becker, an advisor whose 
services White and Level engaged. The evidence before the District Court 
concerned several questions which, although the court decided them in 
Unisys's favor, raised serious questions about Unisys's prudence. (1) 
Whether Unisys conducted an adequate independent investigation into 
Becker's recommendation? (2) Whether Unisys conducted an adequate 
investigation of its own after it ceased use of Becker's services? (3) 
Whether credit ratings were sufficient to prove that Unisys acted 
prudently? (4) Whether the Unisys trustees adequately considered and 
debated the advantages and disadvantages of the Executive Life GICs? 
(5) Whether the fact that the Executive Life GICs bore a higher interest 
rate was sufficient to suggest that they were not prudent investments? 
(6) Whether it was imprudent for Unisys not to maintain written 
investment guidelines? 
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F.3d at 809. In neither Lauria nor Holbrook did the effect of 
the expert's particular qualifications on the weight properly 
accorded to his testimony play any part in our harmless 
error analysis. See Lauria, 145 F.3d at 600 (discussing 
harmless error without mentioning the quality of the 
improperly excluded expert's qualifications); Holbrook, 80 
F.3d at 787 (same). Similarly, the impact of questions about 
Dr. Gottheimer's credibility on the weight due his testimony 
should not play a part in our harmless error analysis in 
this case. 
 
I find further support for this conclusion in an 
examination of what the District Court identified as 
"impeachment" of Dr. Gottheimer. The District Court stated 
that "Dr. Gottheimer was impeached no fewer than four 
times on the relatively straight forward questions on his 
qualifications." 1997 WL 732473, at *26; see also 1997 WL 
732473, at *21-*22. But this so-called "impeachment" 
involved at most minor inconsistencies. First, Dr. 
Gottheimer testified at trial that he could not recall having 
testified in court in a case involving a life insurance 
company, although he stated at his deposition three years 
earlier that twenty-four out of the twenty-five times he had 
testified in court involved property-casualty insurance 
companies. See 1997 WL 732473, at *21. Second, although 
at his deposition he could not recall having done consulting 
work involving life insurance company solvency, he testified 
that he had been retained once before his deposition and 
several times after his deposition to do such consulting. See 
1997 WL 732473, at *21-*22. Third, while he testified at 
trial that there were "some differences and there are also 
some similarities in the way" one analyzes life insurance as 
opposed to property-casualty insurance company solvency, 
in his deposition he agreed with Unisys's attorney that 
there were "fundamental differences." See  1997 WL 732473, 
at *22. 
 
I cannot see how these answers, under any reasonable 
reading, suggest that Dr. Gottheimer is a completely 
incredible witness. At most, they suggest that he could 
remember some things at his deposition that he could not 
at trial, and vice versa. Certainly, Dr. Gottheimer's 
statements at trial were not directly inconsistent with those 
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in his deposition. A comparison of the statements does not 
raise an inference that Dr. Gottheimer was being evasive, 
let alone lying. Thus, I cannot agree with the majority that 
the at worst minor inconsistencies in Dr. Gottheimer's 
testimony make it highly probable that his testimony would 
not have affected the District Court's judgment. 
 
Accordingly, I do not think that the District Court's 
erroneous exclusion of Dr. Gottheimer's expert witness 
testimony was harmless. Therefore, I would remand this 
case for a new trial in which Dr. Gottheimer's testimony 
could be presented; hence, I dissent. 
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